Is part-time employment beneficial for firm productivity? by Nelen, A.C. et al.
  
 
Is part-time employment beneficial for firm
productivity?
Citation for published version (APA):
Nelen, A. C., de Grip, A., & Fouarge, D. (2011). Is part-time employment beneficial for firm productivity?
(ROA Research Memoranda; No. 2). Maastricht: Researchcentrum voor Onderwijs en Arbeidsmarkt,
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2011
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Is Part-Time Employment Beneficial for Firm 
Productivity?
Annemarie Nelen
Andries de Grip
Didier Fouarge
 
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market | ROA
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market 
Maastricht University
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands 
T +31 43 3883647 F +31 43 3884914 
secretary-roa-sbe@maastrichtuniversity.nl  
www.roa.nl
ROA-RM-2011/2
ROA Research Memorandum
Is Part-Time Employment Beneficial for 
Firm Productivity?
Annemarie Nelen 
Andries de Grip
Didier Fouarge
ROA-RM-2011/2*
January 2011
* The ROA Research Memorandum Series was created in order to make research results available for discussion, 
before those results are submitted for publication in journals.
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market
Maastricht University
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands 
T +31 43 3883647 F +31 43 3884914 
secretary-roa-sbe@maastrichtuniversity.nl  
www.roa.nl
Abstract
Is Part-Time Employment Beneficial for Firm Productivity?**
This paper analyzes whether part-time employment is beneficial for firm productivity 
in the service sector. Using a unique dataset on the Dutch pharmacy sector 
that includes the work hours of all employees and a “hard” physical measure of 
firm productivity, we estimate a production function including heterogeneous
employment shares based on work hours. We find that a larger part-time employment 
share leads to greater firm productivity. Additional data on the timing of labor 
demand show that part-time employment enables firms to allocate labor more 
efficiently. First, firms with part-time workers can bridge the gap between opening 
hours and a full-time work week. Second, we find that during opening hours part-time
workers are scheduled differently than full-timers. For example, we 
find that part-time workers enable their full-time colleagues to take 
lunch breaks so that the firm can remain open during these times. 
JEL classification: J24, L23, L25
Keywords: Heterogeneous labor, matched employer–employee data, allocation of labor,
timing of labor demand.
Annemarie Nelen
ROA
Postbus 616
NL-6200 MD Maastricht
The Netherlands
a.nelen@maastrichtuniversity.nl
Andries de Grip
ROA
Postbus 616
NL-6200 MD Maastricht
The Netherlands
a.degrip@maastrichtuniversity.nl
Didier Fouarge
ROA
Postbus 616
NL-6200 MD Maastricht
The Netherlands
d.fouarge@maastrichtuniversity.nl
** The authors are grateful to Daniëlle Bertrand-Cloodt, Arnaud Dupuy, Dan Hamermesh, Ben Kriechel,
 and seminar and conference participants at Maastricht University, SOLE 2009 in Boston, ESPE 2009
 in Sevilla, LOPSI 2009 in Milan, EALE 2009 in Tallinn, and the IZA Summer School 2010 in Buch
 am Ammersee for useful discussions and comments on earlier versions of this paper. We thank Sander
 Dijksman for collecting parts of the data.
1 Introduction
Service sectors often employ high rates of part-time employment. This is somewhat
surprising since the human capital theory predicts part-time workers to be less pro-
ductive than full-time workers. Research on the part-time pay penalty confirms this
prediction (e.g., Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti 2008; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta 2005).
Nevertheless, some studies on part-time labor demand suggested that part-time employ-
ment might be beneficial at the firm level if, for example, operating hours exceed the
full-time work week or when firms face fluctuations in customer demand (e.g., Delsen
2006; Owen 1978).
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether part-time employment is beneficial
for firm productivity in service sector firms. For this purpose, we estimate a produc-
tion function including heterogeneous employment shares (cf. Dearden, Reed, and Van
Reenen 2006; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta 2005; Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske 1999)
based on employees’ work hours.
Identification of the relation between part-time employment and firm productivity
requires at least three specific features of the data: (1) a homogeneous sector in terms of
capital use and a homogeneous workforce in terms of education level, (2) information
on the work hours of all employees within firms, and (3) a “hard” physical or mone-
tary measure of productivity. We use a unique matched employer–employee dataset on
Dutch pharmacies that fulfills all three requirements and that can be considered charac-
teristic of service sector firms whose openings hours exceed the full-time work week.
Our analyses focus on the core workers (Osterman 2000, 1994), that is, pharmacy as-
sistants, who account for 70% of total employment, measured in full-time equivalents
(FTEs). All pharmacy assistants have the same educational background (level and field)
required by law to be employed in their profession. Administrative data on the work
hours of all employees in the sector enable us to construct firms’ part-time and full-time
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labor shares based on work hours. Moreover, the number of prescription lines delivered
to customers serves as a “hard” firm-level productivity measure.1
Other studies dealing with the relation between part-time employment and firm
productivity have merely included a dummy variable to indicate the existence or impor-
tance of part-time employment (Arvanitis 2005) or were restricted to subjective produc-
tivity measures (Pe´rotin and Robinson 2000). Our dataset enables us to more precisely
analyze whether part-time employment is beneficial for firm productivity. We find that
firms with a large part-time employment share are more productive than firms with a
large full-time employment share. Internal instrumental variable (IIV) analysis shows
that our findings can be interpreted in a causal manner: A larger part-time employment
share leads to greater firm productivity. Additional data on the timing of labor demand
enable us to thoroughly examine possible allocation efficiencies provided by the use of
part-time employment. We show that firms with high shares of part-time workers can
bridge the gap between opening hours and a full-time work week. Moreover, we show
that part-time workers are allocated differently than full-time workers. In particular, we
find that part-time workers enable their full-time colleagues to take lunch breaks so that
the firm can remain open during these times.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section briefly reviews related litera-
ture. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data and presents
some sample statistics. Section 5 reports the results and presents robustness checks.
Section 6 uses data on the timing of part-time labor demand to determine why part-time
employment could be beneficial for firm productivity. Section 7 discusses the results in
the context of quasi-fixed costs. Section 8 concludes the paper.
1Section 4 explains how registered medicines can be acquired in the Netherlands.
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2 Related literature
Although production function studies have included heterogeneous employment shares
based on skill level, age, and/or gender (e.g., Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti 2008; Il-
makunnas and Maliranta 2005), they implicitly assumed that part-time and full-time
workers are equally productive in the hours they work. This is in sharp contrast to
studies dealing with the effect of part-time employment on hourly wages. Relying
on the assumption that wages reflect productivity, most studies found part-time work-
ers to be less productive than full-timers in the hours they work (e.g., Hirsch 2005;
Baffoe-Bonnie 2004; Aaronson and French 2004; Ermisch and Wright 1993). One ex-
ception is Manning and Petrongolo (2008), who found that including information on
workers’ occupations almost fully closes the gap between the hourly wages of part-time
and full-time workers.
Apart from these individual productivity effects, part-time employment can also
affect firm productivity through allocation efficiencies. Explanations for such firm-level
productivity advantages in employing part-time workers can be found in the literature on
part-time labor demand. This stream of literature describes several scenarios in which
the demand for part-time employment is relatively high. Owen (1978) argued that firms
employ part-time labor to avoid hiring overlapping shifts of full-time workers in in-
dustries where operating hours exceed the full-time 40-hour work week. Furthermore,
Owen hypothesized that employers will use part-timers when there are fluctuations in
demand. The author’s results indeed show that the relative demand for part-time labor
is higher in industries with an uneven distribution of temporal service demands, than in
other industries. Mabert and Showalter (1990) also argued that the introduction of part-
time employment implies efficiency gains in service sector firms that face fluctuations in
customer demand because of the accompanying reduction in the number of hours during
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which workers are inactive due to lack of demand. These scenarios suggest allocation
efficiency due to part-time employment.
However, research on the effect of part-time work on firm productivity is scarce
and has mainly been limited to the inclusion of a part-time dummy for the presence or
importance of part-time employment in firms.2 Arvanitis (2005) constructed a dummy
variable to indicate whether part-time work is important within a firm. The author
found a negative relation between the importance of part-time work and sales per FTE.
Whereas Pe´rotin and Robinson (2000) included a variable measuring the fraction of
part-time employment in their analyses, their dataset is restricted to subjective produc-
tivity measures. The authors did not find a significant relation between the proportion
of part-time employment and managers’ self-assessed labor productivity.3
3 Empirical approach
Our approach is inspired by three papers that modeled the productivity effects of differ-
ent employment shares (Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen 2006; Ilmakunnas and Mali-
ranta 2005; Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske 1999).4 The approach assumes that dif-
ferent types of employees are perfect substitutes but can have different marginal produc-
tivities. The sector under scrutiny, the Dutch pharmacy sector (see Section 4), employs
2One exception is a French study by Roux (2007) that examined the effect of part-time labor shares
relative to full-time labor shares on firms’ value added. However, it did not focus on a homogeneous
workforce, which complicates identification of the part-time employment effect. Moreover, the reliability
of value added as a productivity measure is questionable in labor-intensive sectors.
3Whereas our study is the first to examine possible productivity differences between part-time and
full-time work hours, there exists literature on the differences between standard and overtime hours.
Most of these studies used data at the industry level (e.g., Craine 1973; Feldstein 1967). As criticized by
Leslie and Wise (1980), it is difficult to interpret these results, since the coefficient for the average work
week can reflect other differences between industries.
4Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen (2006) allowed for productivity differentials by training participa-
tion, education, occupation, age, tenure, and gender. Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005) included employ-
ment shares based on age, level and field of education, and gender. Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske
(1999) distinguished employment shares by gender, race, marital status, age, education, and occupation.
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a homogeneous core workforce with respect to education and gender, which allows us
to divide the workforce into three employment shares: part-time (PT) and full-time (FT)
core workers and other employees (OE). With the latter as our reference group, and its
productivity normalized to unity, the relative productivity of the part-time employment
share equals γpt and the relative productivity of the full-time employment share equals
γ f t . If the γ ′s are larger than unity, the relevant employment share is more productive
than the reference group of other employees. The quality-adjusted labor input is there-
fore
L∗ = L[1+(γpt −1)PTL +(γ f t −1)
FT
L
] (1)
Under the assumption that (γpt − 1)PTL and (γ f t − 1)FTL are “small,” we can simplify
Equation 1 by the following approximation5:
ln[1+(γpt −1)PTL +(γ f t −1)
FT
L
]≈ (γpt −1)PTL +(γ f t −1)
FT
L
(2)
The part-time and full-time employment shares are thereby directly included in a log-
form production function. Using the quality-adjusted labor input (L∗), we write the
Cobb–Douglas production function as follows6:
Y = AKαL∗β (3)
5Following Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen (2006) and Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005), we make
this assumption to simplify the estimation—and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is then pos-
sible. However, the assumption can be relaxed without affecting our main findings. Following
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), we also estimate a nonlinear least squares model. The results
are similar, with the productivity differential between firms’ shares of part-time and full-time employees
being statistically significant.
6Since we assume capital use to be homogeneous across firms and workers, we only have
one production input, quality-adjusted labor, and cannot estimate a translog production function as
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) did.
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where output (Y ) is a function of capital K and quality-adjusted labor L∗. Taking the
logs of terms and using the approximation in Equation 2, we have
ln(Y ) = ln(A)+α ln(K)+β ln(L)+β (γpt −1)PTL +β (γ f t −1)
FT
L
(4)
We follow Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005) in allowing for deviations from con-
stant returns to scale. When FTEs are used instead of the number of workers L, the
production function becomes
ln(Y ) = lnA+α ′ln(K)+(α ′+β ′−1)ln(FT E)+
β ′(γ ′pt −1)
PTFT E
FT E
+β ′(γ ′f t −1)
FTFT E
FT E
(5)
where PTFT E and FTFT E denote the number of part-time and full-time FTEs per firm,
respectively.
Contrary to the three studies mentioned above, our focus on one particular sector
allows us to assume capital use is homogeneous across firms. Therefore, the following
production function is estimated:
ln(Y ) = θ +δ ln(FT Ei)+φpt pti+φ f t f ti+ εi (6)
where pti and f ti denote firms’ part-time and full-time employment shares as defined as
PTFT E
FT E and
FTFT E
FT E , respectively. Moreover, θ is a constant term and includes lnA and α
′,
δ equals (α ′+β ′−1), and φpt and φ f t denote β ′(γ ′pt −1) and β ′(γ ′f t −1), respectively.
If φpt and φ f t are larger than zero, results imply that firms’ shares of core employees are
more productive than their shares of other employees. If φpt is significantly larger than
φ f t , firms with a large share of part-time workers will be, on average, more productive
than firms with a large share of full-time workers. We do not interpret a significant
difference between φpt and φ f t as a marginal productivity difference between part-time
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and full-time workers because the coefficients could reflect allocation efficiencies due to
part-time employment. In alternative specifications, the model also controls for worker,
pharmacist, firm, and market characteristics (see Section 4).
Moreover, because of potential endogeneity of employment shares, we also perform an
IIV analysis. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Arellano and Bond (1991) explained IIV
estimation for panel data, and an implication of the model can be found in Black and Lynch
(2001). The authors estimated a generalized method of moments model, combining a
production function in differences and levels. They instrumented current values of cap-
ital, labor, and materials by lagged values of both the levels and the changes over time
of capital, labor, materials, and outputs. The idea is that lagged values are assumed to
be correlated with current values, but independent of the error term.
Because we do not have panel data, we are unable to estimate such a model. Nev-
ertheless, the administrative data from which we retrieve the number of working hours
are available for two years (see Section 4). Therefore, we instrument firms’ part-time
and full-time employment shares by their lagged values, that is, firms’ shares two years
earlier. Under the credible assumption that these lagged values are correlated with cur-
rent values, but independent of the error term, this type of IIV will pick up (at least some
of the) endogeneity. Because we do not have panel data, we cannot test whether lagged
explanatory variables are independent of the error term.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
We use a unique matched employer–employee dataset of Dutch pharmacies that ful-
fills all requirements to identify the relation between part-time employment and firm
productivity. This dataset includes two sources of information: (1) employee admin-
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istrative data7 and (2) an employer survey. The datasets are merged on the basis of a
unique firm identifier. The employers from all 1,890 Dutch pharmacies were invited to
participate in an employer survey in January 2008, with two reminders sent in February
and March 2008. Our final sample consists of 236 firms.8 Analyses related to the non-
response show that our sample is selective with respect to a pharmacy’s geographical
location, but not with respect to the firm’s other characteristics.9 Therefore, we include
regional dummies in all analyses.
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is firm productivity. This is measured in
the employer survey by firms’ numbers of prescription lines delivered to customers in
2007.10 Every prescription line refers to a particular medicine that has been prescribed
by a family doctor. In the Netherlands, this is the only possible way to obtain registered
medicines. There is a close link between the number of prescription lines and firm sales
due to the fixed amount of 6.10 euros that pharmacies receive for each prescription line,
and because pharmacies only have a small market share in the sale of non-registered
medicines.11 The physical character of this productivity measure ensures a relatively
“hard” measure of firm productivity (Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson, and Strauss
1996). Table 1 reports sample statistics of our employer–employee sample. On average,
7This dataset is provided by the pharmacy sector’s pension fund (PMA) and contains information on
all employed workers within the sector. The data are from January 2006 and 2008.
8The dataset consists of 260 firms; data cleaning eliminated 24 firms.
9Our sample is representative with respect to key variables in our analysis, namely, the number of
prescription lines delivered in 2007 and the hours distribution within firms. Whereas in our sample the
average pharmacy delivered 78,291 prescription lines, the average number of prescription lines over the
1,890 pharmacies equals 78,000 (data from SFK, an independent foundation that publishes key indicators
for the pharmacy sector). Moreover, our sample is representative with respect to the distribution of work
hours among pharmacy assistants and other employees.
10De Grip and Sieben (2005) used the same measure of productivity in their analyses on pharmacy
assistant productivity.
11In the Netherlands, most non-registered medicines are bought in firms other than pharmacies: Com-
mercial drugstores and supermarkets have a market share of 85% for non-registered medicines (data from
IMS Health, htt p : //www.hbd.nl/view.c f m?pageid = 4288).
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firms delivered 78,291 (exp(11.21)) prescription lines in 2007.
[Table 1 about here]
Explanatory variables. Our main variables of interest are firms’ heterogeneous employ-
ment shares in terms of FTEs. Therefore, we need to know the number of work hours of
all the workers within all the firms. Information on contractual work hours for pharmacy
assistants and other support staff is available in the administrative dataset. Information
about the work hours of pharmacists is available from the employer survey. With these
data, we can distinguish between firms’ shares of part-time core employees, full-time
core employees, and other employees. We focus on the core workers, that is, pharmacy
assistants,12 because of their homogeneity with respect to several characteristics. Phar-
macy assistants all have the same educational background required by law (in terms of
both level and field). Moreover, the population of pharmacy assistants is homogeneous
with respect to gender, 99% being female. We compute firms’ part-time and full-time
(core) employment shares as follows: pti =
FT Ei,pt
FT Ei,total
and f ti =
FT Ei, f t
FT Ei,total
.13
The standard full-time work week in the pharmacy sector being 36 hours, we define
part-time workers as pharmacy assistants with fewer than 24 contractual work hours,
that is, fewer than three work days. This definition differs from the definitions of part-
time work usually used in the literature on part-time employment. Although there is
no generally agreed upon standard, definitions ranging from 30 to 35 hours a week are
most common (e.g., Connolly and Gregory 2008; Manning and Petrongolo 2008). How-
ever, our definition is well suited within our context. The Netherlands is known for its
large share of part-time employment. Moreover, the pharmacy sector employs almost
exclusively female pharmacy assistants with less than full-time work hours. Within the
12Osterman (2000, 1994) defined these core workers as the largest group of non-supervisory, non-
managerial workers in a firm who are directly involved in making the product or providing the service.
13Firms’ share of other employees is constructed the same way: oei =
FT Ei,oe
FT Ei,total
.
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Netherlands as a whole, around 50% of all working women work fewer than 24 hours.
In the pharmacy sector, 42% work fewer than 24 hours a week.14 Figure 1 shows the
distribution of the work hours of all core workers within the sample. Whereas working
fewer than two days (16 hours) is uncommon in the sector, working part-time is not. The
largest group of core workers works between 16 and 24 hours per week. Work weeks
of 24 to 32 hours and 32 to 36 hours per week are also quite common in the pharmacy
sector. A total of 20% of all pharmacy assistants work exactly 36 hours per week (not
shown in Figure 1). Section 5.2 checks the robustness of our findings by using other
definitions of part-time employment and by dividing the core workers into more em-
ployment shares.
[Figure 1 about here]
Table 1 reports the average sizes of firms’ employment shares and shows that firms’ part-
time employment share is, on average, equal to 0.19, and their full-time employment
share is, on average, equal to 0.50. This large difference between firms’ part-time and
full-time employment shares is due to measurement in FTEs. Together, core workers
account for almost 70% of firms’ total employment.
Apart from these core workers, pharmacies employ pharmacists and other support
staff. Most important among the latter are assistants’ support staff and student phar-
macy assistants. Assistants’ support staff help pharmacy assistants in activities related
to the production process. Student pharmacy assistants are involved in a dual training
track combining work and classroom education.15 As can be seen in Table 1, the other
14The difference in the percentage of part-timers working is due to a larger percentage of Dutch women
(compared to Dutch pharmacy assistants) working in jobs with fewer than 16 hours a week (data from
OSA-Labour Supply Panel 2006).
15Due to the involvement of all employment types in the primary production process, all employees in
the sector are substitutes.
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employees altogether account for 31% of firms’ total employment.
Control variables. Since firm productivity can also be influenced by worker, pharma-
cist, firm, and market characteristics, we control for such confounders. We include the
total number of firms’ employees, in FTEs, to take into account deviations from con-
stant returns to scale. On average, firms’ total number of FTEs equals 9.9.16 Regarding
worker characteristics, we include the average age and tenure of the core workers. This
information is available from the administrative data covering all employees. Table 1
shows that assistants are on average 38 years old and have a firm tenure of slightly
more than eight years.17 We include pharmacist tenure to control for productivity dif-
ferences due to employers. On average, pharmacists have a tenure of almost 16 years.
The firm characteristics we include in our analyses are pharmacy type (independent or
not), newly founded firm (yes/no), number of opening hours, and variables related to
possible inefficiencies in the firm’s allocation of labor: a dummy variable equal to one
when employers report excess labor, and zero otherwise, and a variable measuring ab-
senteeism due to sick leave from the fraction of workers calling in sick during the last
calendar year. These variables are constructed from the employer survey. Table 1 shows
that 42% of pharmacies are characterized as independent firms. The rest cooperate with
other pharmacies, either in terms of chains or franchises or as part of legalized partner-
ships. A total of 4% of the firms are newly founded. On average, pharmacies are open
for around 50 hours a week, while the full-time work week for pharmacy assistants
equals 36 hours. A total of 13% of the firms report excess labor. The average annual
absentee rate is 4%.
16Table 1 reports the logarithmic form because we use the log form in the analyses as well.
17Since the majority of assistants are female and career breaks are common, we include both age and
tenure in the analyses. Since the correlation between age and tenure is 35%, including both variables will
not cause any problems in the estimations.
11
Finally, we account for two market characteristics that can affect productivity: the
demand for medicines in the neighborhood where the pharmacy is located and the local
degree of competition. We measure demand for medicines by the percentage of elderly
(60+ years old) living within the pharmacy’s postal code (four digits) area. Table 1
shows that, on average, the percentage of elderly within a postal code equals 22%.18
The degree of competition is measured by the number of competitors within a radius
of five kilometers. This is calculated as the distances between all the pharmacies in the
sample and all the other pharmacies located in the same region on the basis of postal
codes.19 Table 1 shows that the number of competitors differs considerably across firms.
Although, on average, firms have around 10 competitors, some have no competitors.
The pharmacy facing the most competition has 77 competitors within a radius of five
kilometers.
5 Results
5.1 Part-time employment and firm productivity
Table 2 shows the estimation results of several specifications of our production function.
Column (1) takes into account only the scale effect and the two employment shares. The
difference between the coefficients of firms’ shares of part-time and full-time employ-
ees (φpt −φ f t) equals 0.556 and is significant at the 1% level. This finding implies that
firms with a large share of part-time employees are more productive than firms with a
low share of part-time employees.
18 These data are from the online statistical database of Statistics Netherlands (CBS Statline).
19We use a standard Dutch regional classification (COROP). The Netherlands counts 40 COROP re-
gions, and every COROP region has a central point (city) with a surrounding service area.
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[Table 2 about here]
Column (2) reports the regression results when including worker, pharmacist, and firm
characteristics. The main results remain the same; however, the productivity differential
is slightly smaller when including control variables. The finding that firms with a large
share of part-time employees are more productive than firms with a large share of full-
time employees still holds at the 2% level. We do not report the control variables,
since none of them are significant. The only exception is a dummy variable denoting
whether the firm is newly founded. We find that newly founded firms are significantly
less productive than older firms, which is in line with the literature on the impact of
vintage on productivity (e.g., Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh 2001). The results given
in Column (3) include a set of variables that indicate the demand and competition the
pharmacy faces, as specified in Section 4.20 Again, the finding that firms with a large
share of part-time employment are more productive than firms with a large share of
full-time employment is unaffected by the inclusion of these market characteristics.
Column (4) reports the results of an IIV regression.21 Firms’ part-time and full-
time employment shares are instrumented by their shares in January 2006, that is, two
years earlier. The coefficient of firms’ full-time employment share becomes insignifi-
cant. Nevertheless, the difference between firm’s part-time and full-time employment
shares remains significant. This suggests that we can interpret our results in a causal
manner: A larger part-time employment share leads to greater firm productivity.
20These controls are not significant either. We tried several alternative specifications for the measures
for demand and competition, such as the number of inhabitants within a postal code area, the number
of competitors within a radius of 10 kilometers, and the degree of urbanization. However, these did not
change the estimation results.
21Since the adjusted R-squared value is smaller in specification (3) than in (2), we choose specification
(2) for this analysis. However, using specification (3) does not change our results.
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5.2 Robustness checks
This section presents a series of robustness checks that address two particularly impor-
tant decisions made in the estimation of Equation 6: the definition of part-time employ-
ment and the division of core workers into two groups.
5.2.1 The definition of part-time employment
A first robustness analysis tests whether our estimation results change when using dif-
ferent thresholds for part-time employment. Figure 2 reports the coefficients of firms’
part-time and full-time employment shares, as well as their confidence intervals, using
definitions of part-time employment ranging from working fewer than 16 hours to fewer
than 33 hours per week.22 Figure 2 shows several interesting findings: When a part-time
work week is defined as less than 16 hours, that is, less than two days a week, the co-
efficients of firms’ shares of part-time and full-time core workers are not significantly
different from each other. This is due to the large confidence interval of the coefficient
for firms’ part-time employment share, which, in turn, may be due to the small varia-
tion in this variable across firms. On average, when part-time employment is defined as
a work week of less than 16 hours, firms’ part-time employment share equals 0.017%
(with a standard deviation equal to 0.032). When part-time employment is defined as a
work week of less than h hours with h = [16, ...,20], the same line of reasoning holds:
Despite a larger coefficient for firms’ share of part-time employees compared to their
share of full-time employees, the imprecision of the estimated coefficients results in an
insignificant difference between the firms’ part-time and full-time employment shares.
[Figure 2 about here]
22The analyses are comparable to those reported in Table 2, Column (3).
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Figure 2 shows that when part-time work is defined as a work week of less than 21
hours, the coefficient of the part-time employment share is significantly higher than that
of the full-time employment share. This also holds when part-time work is defined as
a work week shorter than 22, 23, or 24 hours. However, when we define part-time
employment as a work week of less than h hours with h = [25, ...,33], the coefficients of
firms’ part-time and full-time employment shares are not significantly different.
The robustness checks show that our finding is robust to a particular range of hours
for defining part-time employment. When we use definitions of part-time employment
that reflect larger jobs, our results suggest that firms that employ large shares of part-
time employees are as productive as firms that employ large shares of full-time employ-
ees. This suggests that firms are not able to benefit from allocation efficiencies when a
relatively large share of workers works at least 24 hours a week.
5.2.2 More shares of core employees
We also check the robustness of our results by distinguishing core workers in small,
medium, and large part-time jobs and full-time jobs. We define the four groups as
follows: Employees in small part-time jobs work fewer than 16 hours. Employees in
medium-sized part-time jobs work between 16 and 24 hours per week. Large part-
time jobs are jobs of 24 hours or more per week but fewer than 32 hours. Employees
working 32 hours per week or more are defined as full-time workers. We compute the
employment shares for these four groups of core workers and use, as previously, other
employees as the reference group. Except for including two extra shares of employees,
the estimation strategy remains the same. Table 3 reports the results.
As before, we compare the relative productivity of the different employment shares
of core employees. Table 3 shows no significant coefficient for the share of firms’ small
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part-time employment.23 The share of firms’ medium part-time employment has the
largest coefficient. Table 3 shows that the coefficient for the share of firms’ large part-
time employment is only weakly significant, and the size of the coefficient is much
smaller than the size of the coefficient for firms’ medium part-time employment share.
Most important is the finding that the share of firms’ medium part-time employment is
significantly more productive than the share of firms’ full-time employment (at the 3%
level). The finding that the coefficient of the share of firms’ large part-time employment
is only weakly significant supports the hypothesis mentioned in Section 5.2.1, that the
number of work hours of these part-time workers is too large to be allocated as effi-
ciently as for part-time workers with fewer work hours per week. From this robustness
check, we conclude that firms especially benefit from a large share of part-time employ-
ees working between 16 and 24 hours per week.
[Table 3 about here]
In conclusion, our robustness analyses show that firms with a large part-time employ-
ment share are more productive than firms with a large full-time employment share.
This appears to be due to the fraction of part-time employees working between 16 and
24 hours per week, suggesting that these part-time workers are allocated most efficiently.
6 Why is part-time employment beneficial for firm pro-
ductivity?
Our finding that firms with a large share of part-time employment are more productive
than firms with a large share of full-time employment could be due to allocation effi-
23Again, this is probably due to this variable’s small value and small standard deviation, as explained
in Section 5.2.1.
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ciency offered by part-time employment. If this is true, part-time workers do not have
to be more productive than full-time workers in the hours they work, for the use of part-
time work to increase productivity at the firm level. Especially in service sector firms,
part-time employment can, for example, be used to bridge the gap between opening
hours and contractual work hours. Such a gap is also observed in our data. On average,
firms are open around 50 hours a week, whereas the full-time work week counts 36
hours (see Table 1).
A second argument for the beneficial allocation effects of part-time employment
is related to fluctuations in customer demand during opening hours. Due to these
fluctuations, part-time employment enables firms to cushion peak hours by deploying
more workers during that time than during opening hours with lower customer demand.
Whether part-time or full-time workers are deployed during peak hours can depend on
their relative productivity. A third way in which part-time employees can provide allo-
cation efficiencies is by bridging the lunch breaks of their full-time colleagues.
To gain more insight into the allocation efficiency of part-time employment, we use ad-
ditional data on the timing of labor demand within the Dutch pharmacy sector. These
data are provided by the administrator of a scheduling program that is used by almost
half of all Dutch pharmacies.24 Therefore, we know the work schedules of all the em-
ployees of 900 pharmacies in January 2010. From this dataset, we construct for each
week the firms’ number of core employees working and the fraction of part-time core
workers in each half-hour time slot. Based on this information, we examine possible
weekly and daily allocation efficiencies. At the individual level, we also look at the
correlations between the number of contractual work hours, on the one hand, and the
24This scheduling program is freely available online to Dutch pharmacies. It allows them to plan the
work time of their employees and contains details on the positions of employees, their contractual work
hours, and the time slots they are scheduled to work.
17
number of work hours per day and the work days per week, on the other hand.
Table 4 shows the correlation between, on the one hand, workers’ contractual work
hours and, on the other hand, the number of hours worked per work day, as well as the
number of work days per week and per month. The correlation coefficients in Table 4
show that the greater the number of contractual work hours, the more hours employees
work per work day. Nevertheless, Table 4 also shows that it is not the case that part-time
workers work one or two hours per day solely to cover the lunch break of a full-time
colleague. The table also shows that longer contractual work hours significantly relate
to more work days per week and per month. Part-time workers therefore work not only
fewer hours per work day, but also fewer days per week (month). This implies that part-
time workers are allocated differently than full-time employees. The following analyzes
whether the different allocations of part-time and full-time employees result in weekly
or daily allocation efficiencies or both.
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 3 around here]
Figure 3 shows the allocation of total labor and part-time employment over the days
of the week. Total labor is measured by the number of half-hour time slots worked by
all employees per day. We sum the number of half-hour time slots of all employees
working in the firm on that day. The share of part-time employment is computed as the
number of all time slots worked by part-time employees over the total number of time
slots worked by all employees.
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Figure 3 shows small fluctuations in the total amount of labor deployed across
days.25 Moreover, there seem to be some fluctuations in the share of part-time em-
ployment. Especially on Wednesday and Friday, the share of part-time employment
is smaller than on other days; however, this seems to be supply driven, since children
below age 12 do not have classes on Wednesday afternoon and, additionally, children
below age seven do not have classes on Friday afternoon. Altogether, we have to con-
clude that Figure 3 does not show a clear relation between total labor needed on a day
and employers’ use of part-time employment over the week.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
Figure 4 shows the allocation of workers over the work day. As far as fluctuations in
total labor needed reflect fluctuations in customer demand, we do not observe much
fluctuation in customer demand in the sector. The only exception is a daily low point
during lunch time (between 12:00 PM and 1:30 PM); however, this is more likely to re-
flect the necessity of a lunch break for full-timers than a low point in customer demand.
To see whether part-time employees are used to bridge the lunch breaks of full-time
workers, we distinguish between firms that deploy no core employees and firms that
do deploy core employees during lunch time. Figure 4 shows the average number of
core employees and the fraction of part-time core employees for the first week of Jan-
uary 2010 (averaged over all firms),26 as well as several features that suggest allocation
efficiencies provided by part-time employees.
• For all time slots, the fraction of part-time employees is larger in firms where no
core employees are deployed at some time between 12:00 PM and 1:30 PM.
25Only on Saturday there is a clear drop in total labor deployed due to a large number of firms that are
closed that day; firms that are open are often only open in the morning.
26Figures based on the other weeks look similar.
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• In the sample of firms that deploy at least one core employee during lunch time
(the “no lunch break” sample), the fraction of part-time employees is largest dur-
ing lunch time. This suggests that part-time workers indeed bridge the lunch
breaks of their full-time colleagues. Moreover, as Table 4 shows, it is not the case
that part-time workers work for only one or two hours during the lunch break.
Some part-time workers start in the morning and work until after lunch time,
while others start before lunch and work until closing time.27
• As shown in Figure 3, the fraction of part-time core employees is smallest on
Wednesdays and Fridays. More precisely, on these days, the fraction of part-time
employees is smaller in the afternoon than in the morning. This is noticeable be-
cause on Wednesday and Friday, children below ages 12 and seven, respectively,
do not have classes in the afternoon.
We conclude that the allocation of part-time and full-time workers is quite different.
Part-time workers work fewer hours per work day, as well as fewer days per week
(month) than full-timers. In particular, they seem to bridge the lunch breaks of their
full-time colleagues. Deploying a large fraction of part-time employees therefore seems
to increase allocation efficiency over the work day, which contributes to greater firm
productivity.
7 Discussion
Our findings raise the question of why service sector firms do not employ solely part-
time workers. We think the answer can be found in the literature on part-time labor
27The data used for our estimations in Section 5.1 do not include information on whether firms deploy
core employees during lunch time. Therefore, we cannot estimate the productivity model separately for
these two groups of firms.
20
demand. Montgomery (1988) discussed the determinants of employer demand for part-
time workers. The author argued that the combination of part-time and full-time em-
ployees within firms depends upon the relative cost of providing labor services for each
type of labor. These relative labor costs are determined by three factors: (1) the relative
productivity of part-timers and full-timers, (2) the relative wages of part-timers and full-
timers, and (3) quasi-fixed labor costs. There are no a priori reasons to assume that the
productivity of part-time and full-time workers differs in the hours they work.28 More-
over, as in most other Dutch occupations, the hourly wages of part-time and full-time
pharmacy assistants are similar (Euwals and Hogerbrugge 2004). Therefore, we focus
this discussion on quasi-fixed labor costs.29 Oi (1962) demonstrated that firms bear
quasi-fixed costs of labor. These consist of the administrative costs of supervising and
maintaining records for each worker, costs related to searching for, hiring, and train-
ing new workers, and those components of benefits that are unrelated to hours worked.
Higher quasi-fixed costs are expected to decrease the proportion of jobs going to part-
timers. Owen (1978) gave other examples of quasi-fixed labor costs that can apply to
the service sector, such as supervision, coordination, and communication costs. Since
the number of employees increases due to the usage of part-time workers, supervisors
must oversee more workers or increase the number of layers of supervision. Increased
communication and coordination costs are especially relevant when part-time workers
are used sequentially. In this case it is likely that two groups of workers are formed,
with no obvious need for communication and coordination. Owen (1978) suggested the
28As described in Section 4, all core workers share the same educational field and level. Moreover,
additional analyses on a representative employee survey among pharmacy assistants did not show any
difference in training participation or training intensity between part-time and full-time employees.
29With respect to the relative wages of part-timers and full-timers, Montgomery (1988) referred to
Rosen (1978), who showed that firm and job characteristics determine which wage–hour combination the
firm chooses. Relative productivity may vary among industries. Owen (1978) referred to the following
industry characteristics that may affect the relative productivity of part-timers and full-timers: the capital
intensity of the industry, the degree to which demand varies predictably over the work week, and the lack
of easy division of opening hours into shifts of standard length.
21
use of a full-time worker, a full-time supervisor, and overlapping shifts as possible ways
of dealing with such a situation.
Montgomery (1988) investigated which firm, job, and industry characteristics in-
fluence the existence of part-time employment and the percentage of the firms’ total
employment force that works part-time. The author’s results indicate that quasi-fixed
labor costs have a negative impact on the proportion of part-timers in a firm’s work-
force.30
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes whether part-time employment is beneficial for firm productivity.
Our unique dataset allows analyses of heterogeneous labor shares based on employees’
work hours on a “hard” measure of firm productivity. Using a production function
with quality-adjusted labor, we divide firms’ workforce into part-time and full-time core
workers and other employees. Our focus on a particular occupation that employs almost
exclusively women justifies our part-time definition of working fewer than 24 hours a
week. We find that firms with a large share of part-time employees are more productive
than firms with a large share of full-time employees. IIV analysis shows that our findings
can be interpreted in a causal manner: A larger part-time employment share leads to
greater firm productivity.
Furthermore, we find that the greater productivity of firms with a larger part-time
employment share is probably due to allocation efficiencies. Additional data on the
timing of labor demand show that part-time employees are allocated differently than
full-time employees. Part-time workers work fewer hours per work day, and fewer days
per week. We show that part-time employment increases allocation efficiency over work
30Our data do not include any information on quasi-fixed costs that enable us to analyze the relation
between such costs and firms’ shares of part-time employment and productivity.
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days. In particular, part-time workers are deployed in such a way that they can bridge
the lunch breaks of their full-time colleagues.
Our results may also explain why we observe high fractions of part-time employ-
ment in most service sectors and almost no part-time employment in other sectors. In
general, service sectors provide good conditions for exploiting the allocation efficien-
cies offered by part-time employees. In the retail sector, these conditions are opening
hours that exceed the full-time work week and opening hours during lunch time. In
other service sectors, such as restaurants and call centers, fluctuations in customer de-
mand during the work day or work week could constitute such a condition. In both
cases, allocation efficiencies of part-time employment can increase firm productivity in
service sectors.
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Table 1: Sample statistics of dependent and explanatory variables.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Number of prescription lines 11.21 0.38 8.89 11.98
Explanatory variables
Firms’ part-time employment share in FTEs * 0.19 0.11 0 0.51
Firms’ full-time employment share in FTEs * 0.50 0.14 0.08 1.00
Control variables
Firms’ total number of FTEs (log) 2.22 0.40 0.73 3.09
Assistants’ average age in years 38.03 4.36 22.50 50
Assistants’ average firm tenure in years 8.31 3.10 0.81 17.93
Pharmacist tenure in years 15.84 8.47 0 39
Independent pharmacy (yes/no) 0.42 0.50 0 1
Number of opening hours per week 49.87 12.25 6 168
Excess labor (yes/no) 0.13 0.33 0 1
Absentee ratio 0.04 0.04 0 0.30
Newly founded firm 0.04 0.19 0 1
Percentage of elderly within postal code area 0.22 0.07 0 0.60
Number of competitors within a 5-km radius 9.61 12.25 0 77
Note: * concerns pharmacy assistants only. Sample statistics are based on the final sample (236 pharmacies).
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Figure 1: Distribution of working hours.
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Table 2: Estimation results of production functions with heterogeneous labor
shares based on working hours.
Dep. Variable: Productivity (logs) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total amount of labor in FTEs (logs) 0.740*** 0.693*** 0.703*** 0.639***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
Firms’ employment shares (other employees are the reference group)
Firms’ part-time employment share in FTEs 0.946*** 0.831*** 0.881*** 0.938***
(0.182) (0.187) (0.196) (0.238)
Firms’ full-time employment share in FTEs 0.390*** 0.424*** 0.412*** 0.210
(0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.186)
Constant 9.169*** 9.428*** 9.387*** 9.752***
(0.157) (0.223) (0.233) (0.247)
Worker, pharmacist, and firm characteristics no yes yes yes
External factors no no yes no
Adjusted R squared 0.556 0.581 0.579 0.519
N 236 236 236 236
Model OLS OLS OLS IV
Wald tests: PT share = FT share 12.81 6.04 6.79 9.53
Prob >=F 0.0004 0.0148 0.0098 0.0020
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Specification (1) includes region dummies.
Specification (2) additionally includes assistants’ average age and tenure, pharmacist tenure, the firm’s number of
opening hours per week, the firm’s sick leave percentage, and dummy variables to indicate independent firms, excess
labor, and newly founded firms. Specification (3), moreover, includes the percentage of elderly living in the firm’s
postal code area and the number of competitors within a radius of 5 km. Specification (4) is an internal instrumental
variable (IV) analysis. Firms’ part-time and full-time employment shares are instrumented by their shares one year
earlier (2006), and, for consistency, firms’ total amount of labor is also constructed with 2006 values.
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Figure 2: Coefficients of firms’ part-time and full-time employment shares using differ-
ent definitions of part-time employment.
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Note: This figure reports the coefficients of firms’ part-time and full-time employment shares, as well as their confidence intervals,
using definitions of part-time employment ranging from working fewer than 16 hours to fewer than 33 hours per week. The
analyses are comparable to those reported in Column (2) of Table 2.
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Table 3: Estimation results of different shares of part-
time employment on firm productivity.
Dep. Variable: Productivity (logs)
Total amount of labor in FTEs (logs) 0.690***
(0.046)
Firms’ small part-time employment share in FTEs 0.413
(0.558)
Firms’ medium part-time employment share in FTEs 0.866***
(0.193)
Firms’ large part-time employment share in FTEs 0.340*
(0.178)
Firms’ full-time employment share in FTEs 0.457***
(0.151)
Worker, pharmacist, and firm characteristics yes
Adjusted R squared 0.580
N 236
Wald tests: F(1, 217) = Prob >F
Medium PT share = FT share 5.18 0.0238
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The
same controls are included as in Column (2), Table 2.
Model: OLS.
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Table 4: Correlations between contractual
working hours and the usability of core
employees.
Contractual Part-time
working hours worker
Number of hours 0.2180 -0.3679
per working day (0.000) (0.000)
Number of days 0.7293 -0.6605
worked in week 1 (0.000) (0.000)
Number of days 0.8294 -0.5832
worked in January (0.000) (0.000)
Note: Based on the data of 8,257 core employees.
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Figure 3: Allocation of part-time employees over the week.
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Figure 4: Timing of labor demand — week 1.
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(d) Thursday
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